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THIRD WORLD ARMS PROLIFERATION AND FORCED ENTRY OPERATIONS:
CIRCUMSTANCES DEMANDING THE CREATION OF A STANDING
JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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BY

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Our joint history highlights two critical points in this area. First is that our task organization is routinely a hastily formed Joint Task Force (JTF). The second and more critical point is that the operational-level headquarters is normally an aggregation of individuals brought together at the last possible moment. History also shows us that our headquarters do not have an enviable record in the command and control of first battles.

This combination along with the authors experience in the Second Marine Division from 1984-1989 in both joint training and contingency situations (Solid Shields, Ocean Ventures, Joint Supporting Arms Coordination Exercises and in the initial deployments and planning for operations in Panama) led to the thesis that a CINC requires a trained, cohesive, joint headquarters with an in-depth understanding of current tactics and a joint operational, combined arms vision to plan and execute forced entry against a Third World nation that possesses air defense and antiship missiles and main battle tanks. A headquarters staffed by warfighters who understand the deployment and employment of special operations, amphibious, airborne and light forces; counterair operations and war-at-sea. Skills and knowledge for which our experience and professional education do little to prepare us. We need gunfighters with the intellectual integrity to divorce themselves from Service parochialism and who are capable of seeking the best operational solution.

My recommendation for the headquarters is the Fleet's Amphibious Group, however, there are alternatives and the bottom line is that our joint operational commands must be prepared for their first battle.

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THIRD WORLD ARMS PROLIFERATION AND FORCED ENTRY OPERATIONS:
CIRCUMSTANCES DEMANDING THE CREATION OF A STANDING
JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

An Individual Study Project
Intended For Publication

by

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29 March 1990

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Terrence C. Morgan, LTCOL, USMC

TITLE: Third World Arms Proliferation and Forced Entry Operations:
Circumstances Demanding the Creation of a Standing Joint
Task Force Headquarters

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Secretary Cheney's 1990 Annual Report to the President and the Congress established the requirement for the Unified Commanders in Chief to be prepared for Third World conflict involving increasingly modern weapons. He directed them to prepare strategies for Third World crisis and conflict involving roles and missions requiring, "mobile, highly ready, well equipped forces and solid power projection capabilities." While the Services have forces that are prepared to execute the forced entry missions, what is missing is a joint operational level headquarters to command these joint forced entries.

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My recommendation for the headquarters is the Fleet's Amphibious Group, however, there are alternatives and the bottom line is that our joint operational commands must be prepared for their first battle.

The Setting

Peace may be "breaking out" between the Superpowers, unfortunately this is not a worldwide trend. On any day circumstances necessitating the use of American military force may arise, specifically, a crisis requiring forced entry by U.S. troops.[1] Military operations planned and executed during a rapidly developing crisis. Operations commanded by an ad hoc Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters, a method of command which is a critical vulnerability. Why? We have organized our joint command structure to fight global and major regional wars and neglected the most likely occurrence -- crisis and conflict.[2] Our joint command structure reflects an ethnocentric notion of military superiority that assumes automatic preeminence in Third World conflict and that we can execute even complex military operations with a "pick-up" team.

The Secretary of Defense's Annual Report To The President and Congress addresses these issues and summarizes his guidance to DOD.

In coming decades, we must be prepared for the possible emergence of new powers, for potential Third World conflicts, and for the expansion of threats from insurgencies, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking.[3]

He specifically addresses crisis and forced entry operations.

(6) We must recognize the challenges beyond Europe that may place significant demands on our defense capabilities. The changing requirements and new roles and missions assumed by the U.S. forces will require strategies that rely more heavily on mobile, highly ready, well equipped forces and solid power projection capabilities.[4]

An additional concern is weapons proliferation. The world's arms bazaar is a market place of increasing technology and lethality, unfortunately, not just in conventional weapons. The Developing Countries are seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons with ballistic missiles as their delivery means.[5]

Conclusions from a Center for Strategic and International Studies report, Conventional Combat 2002, second this concern. The report cautions that,

sophisticated weaponry ranging from advanced battle tanks to ballistic missiles in the developing world should force the Department of Defense to prepare for a conflict that may be relatively small but still poses a great challenge.[6]

Mr. Cheney's mission statement to the warfighting CINC's sets the tone,

prepare an active and timely defense against such violence, one that presents a credible deterrence and remains capable of using power when necessary.[7]

In the worst case, the CINC's mission is to prepare to fight a no-plan, crisis action, power projection against a Third World power or transnational group with high technology weapons, and perhaps weapons of mass destruction. Implicit in this mission is that the JTF Commander (COMJTF) be an operational artist ([8]) and that forced entry operations be viewed as the operational level of

war.[9] However, when you examine the DOD definitions of war ([10]), operational art and the operational level of war, (see end notes 8, 9, and 10), the underlying theme is large-scale, sustained armed conflict, not the limited political and military objectives of crisis intervention. We tend to assume away the increasing complexity and lethality of Third World combat. It is an attitude that causes us to pay scant attention to our joint organization and preparation for conflict-level, contingency operations.

As we learned from Vietnam and affirmed with the Weinberger Doctrine, the national will is critical when American military forces are committed to combat. Therefore it is imperative to know the standard by which the nation judges our success or failure. General Dupuy defined this standard, "as the attainment of political objectives in a reasonable time, at bearable cost and with the public support until the end." [11] Our experience shows that senior leaders are held accountable to this standard, no matter the outcome or how bravely their soldiers and sailors fought.

My intent is to examine the problem by presenting the concept of unity of effort, reviewing our first battle experiences and then examining recent joint operations. This will create an appreciation of the problem and how we organize and plan these operations. I'll then restate the problem, analyze elements of the solution and conclude with recommendations. My thesis is that we can best achieve success in the increasingly lethal Third World by improving

the continuity, training and cohesion of our operational, crisis action command structure. Specifically, I propose that each Unified CINC establish a standing JTF Headquarters. The goal is to have immediately available to the warfighting CINC a commander whom he knows, a commander who knows his subordinates and who has had the opportunity to develop the team work and joint operational mind set of his staff. To use S. L. A. Marshall's term, to provide the CINC a "known soldier," a cohesive team that has mastered the joint operational art, a staff that is knowledgeable of Service and Special Operating Forces (SOF) warfighting doctrine and that has firsthand experience in the intricacies, fog and friction of joint forced entry operations.[12]

The Historical Perspective

The seminal military principle for any joint commander is unity of effort -- the optimal concentration of combat power essential for victory or mission accomplishment.[13] A concept that melds unity of effort and the public's expectation of military operations is conceptual unity, or military "fit". It is the joint commander's standard of success:

like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, our military capabilities must be arranged in a manner which develops the picture as a whole recognizing their unique proportions and relations ... Conceptual unity seeks to combine the natural strengths of our various military capabilities in space and time. That must include not only fit among combat forces of the various Services but also the fit between combat and logistics capabilities. [14]

The following examples of "fit" should be familiar.

- > French naval forces cutting off Cornwallis' force at Yorktown where a combined American and French Army defeated him.
- > Joint Union riverine operations in 1862 on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.
- > Nimitz seizing Peleliu and Anguar in the Central Pacific to protect MacArthur's northern flank and then offering him forces to advance the Leyte landing by two months.
- > The combined air, naval and land effort to prepare for and execute the Normandy invasion and then exploit its success.
- > The "fit" of the Inchon landing and the Pusan Perimeter breakout.
- > The rapid concentration of amphibious and airborne forces in Beirut (1958), Santo Domingo (1965), and Grenada (1983) to stabilize fast-breaking political chaos.[15]

History provides another lesson we can ill afford to ignore, the experience of first battles. A area where the U.S. has an unenviable record. In an excellent essay, "First Battles in Retrospect," John Shy provides the box score.

Of the ten first battles, the U.S. Army suffered five defeats (Long Island, Queenstown, Bull Run, Kasserine and Osan/Naktong) and won five victories. Four of these victories were very costly (San Juan, Cantigany, Buna, and Ia Drang) -- some might say too costly for the gains achieved. Only the two-day battle of the Rio Grande in 1846 was relatively cheap, although even there losses approached 10 percent of the forces engaged. Won or lost, the first battle almost guarantees that inexperience will be paid for in blood. ... But here it can be said with some confidence that in only a few instances did inadequately prepared troops fall apart before undergoing severe combat stress: ... More glaring than poorly trained troops as a first battle problem is the weakness of command and control." (emphasis added) [16]

Gaining this experience is not the only problem. The quintessential problem is organizing and training to lessen the growing pains.

The question is how do we prepare to fight joint operational first battles with the military acumen and joint vision of veteran generals and admirals? Or it might be, how do we develop joint operational combat leaders -- warriors with trained minds, honed instincts and sharpened intuition who have the courage and conviction to execute a plan and accept the risks?[17]

Recent Joint Experience

Recent joint operations provide valuable insight into our joint warfighting ability. Four combat operations and one deployment for training show a growing appreciation for the joint operational art.

The seizure of the SS Mayaguez is the benchmark in the measure of our joint capability. As usual the Marines, sailors and airmen fought well, however, as professionals, the "fit" and execution of the operation were subject to question and, overall, many felt we could do better.

Operation Urgent Fury came eight years later. It was a classic crisis. Our response was a classic conflict response -- a joint forced entry operation. An operation that is in line with Secretary Cheney's current tasking but not the current worst case. Missing were high technology weapons -- ballistic, antitank, sea denial and air defense missiles and other modern ground combat systems. The weapon systems that increase the risk and require the joint commander either to execute synchronized, joint, combined arms warfare or to pay the first battle price in blood.

Volumes have been written on Grenada. For my purpose, Chapter 7, "Urgent Fury: The Concept", from British Army Major Mark Adkins' book Urgent Fury: the battle for Grenada is an excellent unclassified source on the fog and friction of joint, crisis action planning.

The planning cycle for combat operations was less than four days with detailed planning done by the Commander in Chief, Atlantic's (CINCLANT) staff, a planning conference of component representatives and finally a JTF staff formed from the Second Fleet staff. A synthesis of Major Adkins' pertinent observations on the planning follow:

Admiral MacDonald's (CINCLANT) background was primarily naval aviation. Admiral Metcalf's (Second Fleet/ COMJTF) was command at sea.

The CINCLANT staff was more a specified command than a unified command. Its wartime mission is that of, "winning naval supremacy in the Atlantic in a world war."

The crisis was a surprise. The response required "techniques and tactics bearing no resemblance to maneuvering battle groups, convoy protection or anti-submarine warfare, the normal day-to-day activities"

When an invasion became the course of action on 22 October, CINCLANT's staff realized its lack of intelligence and communications capability. It also recognized that it didn't have "the planning expertise for large scale ground operations."

A high level planning conference on 22 October was "not a great success." The Military Airlift Command representative was not there; he wasn't told about Urgent Fury until 23 October. The amphibious force representatives were absent; they were at sea. The Joint Special Operation Command had a lieutenant colonel and the Army mustered a Lieutenant Colonel and three junior officers. The attendees were strangers, some wore civilian clothes and who spoke for whom wasn't clear.

The circumstances required an ad hoc joint headquarters (JTF 120). The Second Fleet staff formed its nucleus. The JTF staff had a fly-away operational headquarters of 17, most of whom had never worked with one another before.

Limited Army and Air Force representation on JTF 120 was a problem. On 23 October the JCS appointed the Commanding General of the 24th Mechanized Division as "deputy to Metcalf and his adviser on Army operations." His staff was two majors.

The immediacy required to form JTF 120 limited the joint nature of the staff and consequently the expertise on joint fire support planning, logistics, etc. . [18]

With these as fog and friction, the planners had to develop a plan for an invasion. A plan presenting the world a fait accompli with their morning coffee on 25 October. Essential for success were multiple factors.

to achieve all objectives, the plan required certain basic elements, ... to be over quickly. ... meticulous planning, complete security, flexible and reliable communications, firm command and control, a high standard of interservice cooperation, plus a high logistic backup -- no mean undertaking.[19]

This information should certainly bring to mind questions about JTF formation and crisis action planning.

Key Questions

Where and when does a senior commander learn the joint-operational art?

Specifically, where does he learn the art of employing air, ground, naval and special operating forces with vision, judgement and intuition; gain the knowledge and confidence which allow him to "calculate" and take risks when he is inexperienced in a type of warfare; develop the orchestrating ability to obtain a synergistic effect from the varied military capabilities of a joint force? Are

the War Colleges, the Capstone Course and the General Officer Joint Warfighting Course providing in-depth instruction on the operational problems of conflict response and joint forced entry?

How does the COMJTF determine the strengths and weaknesses of assigned forces?

When does he have the opportunity to experiment with the warfighting and technological advantages of his component forces?

Are warriors being assigned to joint staffs?

These questions identify the key span in the bridge that operational art makes from strategy to tactics, the span from the far shore of tactics to the center of the bridge. We must remember that the greatest operational art is useless if it is not tactically executable by the forces assigned. "Can do" aside, doctrinal/tactical changes, standing operating procedures, equipment fielding, maintenance, training, operational tempo, funding, etc., effect unit performance.

To use a popular term, a JTF staff needs gunfighters to provide the current warfighting styles and skills. Individuals who have the confidence of the commanders and staffs, individuals who are "known soldiers".[20] The staff must be up-to-date warfighters, a team composed of former commanders and key operational and logistics staff members -- the operations and tactical action officers, the logisticians and communicators, and the senior enlisted leaders from these areas. The men who have trained, fought and supported brigades, ships and squadrons.

A staff with this background will be an exceptional resource. Their experience will allow COMJTF to develop the German "fingerspitzengefühl" (a feeling at the tip of his fingers) or as Americans might say "I can feel it in my bones." connection to all of his force.[21] A feeling that will allow him to employ air, ground, naval and special operating forces at what they do best, taking the greatest advantage of training and technology.

How does COMJTF communicate his intent and concept to and through a staff which is an unknown quantity, to commanders and staffs at least two levels down?

A JTF Commander usually fights his first battle with subordinate commanders he probably doesn't know and with whom he has never exercised. Can COMJTF be confident that his commanders and their staffs are sufficiently open minded to understand his joint-operational intent? Are they adequately skilled in the operational art to envision the intended synchronization, branches and sequels of his operation? Can he be comfortable in letting them exercise initiative and that they will seize the opportunities which support the commander's intent?

A recent deployment for training, Operation Golden Pheasant (Honduras) and the combat operations Earnest Will (Persian Gulf tanker escort), and Just Cause (Panama), highlight forward movement in joint operational thought.

Even though all were joint operations, the operational focus of each was a single warfighting doctrine -- airborne operations or naval composite warfare. Soldiers, sailors and airmen performing

tasks for which they had trained. Headquarters commanding operations which were the norm of their experience. These are examples of operational art which did not require the synchronization of other major warfighting types -- amphibious, counterair, suppression of enemy air defense, antisurface unit warfare, etc. . For example, the air bridge for Just Cause, did not have to fight its way into Panama, either with an air battle to achieve air supremacy or a sea battle to eliminate surface combatants armed with surface to air missiles.

Although not planned as a true crisis action, Just Cause is a model of conceptual unity. The Airborne and Light Infantry deployed as they train, the Ranger-Airborne Team executed what they regularly train to do and the in-country forces executed a plan for which they had trained. It was an operation controlled by a warfighting headquarters (XVIII Airborne Corps) whose expertise is exactly this type of operation.

The crisis action deployment for training, Operation Golden Pheasant, was similar in its singular focus. The deployment also highlights a cohesion building element normally missing in the ad hocery of the rapidly formed joint task force -- commander to commander relationships.

During Golden Pheasant, two battalions of the 7th Light Infantry Division (LID) stationed at Fort Ord, California were task organized within a brigade of the 82D Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. There were no planning conferences, the 7th LID battalions joined the Brigade in the field. In an

interview with one of the Light Infantry Battalion Commanders, he stated his belief that the light infantry battalions deployed were chosen because of their commanders experience in the B2D Airborne. They knew how the airborne fights and where known by the commander "fighting" their battalions. He emphasized his confidence in this rapid task organization because he knew what to expect and the expectations.[22]

This may be a luxury of chance, however, any step made to fight with a "known soldier" is worth the price. As S.L.A. Marshall aptly stated, "it is the man whose identity is well known to his fellows who has the main chance as a battle effective."[23] Although aimed at the rifleman, I think this applies to commanders and staffs as well.

The problem restated

I have been emphasizing key points about future military action. These include the following:

- > Crisis action.
- > Situations requiring original planning.
- > Forced entry.
- > An increased probability of sophisticated weaponry to deny us sea control and air superiority.
- > Ground weapon systems equal to ours and perhaps initially exceeding ours when you factor strategic lift shortfall into the time phased force deployment.

From a top down view, the National Command Authority will task the CINC to resolve a rapidly deteriorating situation by focused military action using the available forces.

In the worst case this will require a true joint effort. There will neither be a predominant Service team nor a predominant Service.[24] The joint forced entry will require all the Services to operate in proximity and support of one another. Success will require a synchronous effort by air, sea and ground forces.

View this operation as Grenada but add a company of main battle tanks, antitank guided missiles, shoulder held and larger air defense missiles and patrol boats with antiship missiles. This is what the COMJTF's worst case battlefield will be and is the standard to which we should organize, plan and train.

Now view the situation from the bottom-up, this comes closer to defining the COMJTF's joint-operational problem. With airborne, light infantry, amphibious, naval, air and special operations forces available, how does COMJTF plan their deployment and employment? Especially if he and the staff are not familiar with their warfighting philosophies, doctrines, tactics and techniques; or their peculiarities and special operating requirements. Given a set of tactical circumstances, how does he exploit advantages and avoid disadvantages? How does he combine these capabilities in a time compressed planning sequence to accomplish the mission in a quick decisive military action? How does COMJTF develop a plan to exploit our advantages and the enemy's vulnerabilities, while avoiding unnecessary complication, destruction and loss of life?

The Concept

COMJTF achieves these operational goals by planning and executing with a cohesive team. The JTF should be led by a headquarters whose members are masters of the joint operational art, knowledgeable in the Services' warfighting doctrine and special operations, and so confident in their position that they can cut through red tape and Service bureaucracy without fear of retribution. The CINC ensures this by establishing or designating a JTF headquarters long before the crisis.

Although there are several ways to do this, no matter the method, each CINC needs an existing joint, joint-operational level, trained, command structure to plan, deploy and fight in response to crisis.

Crisis

This is a key element in the argument for an existing headquarters. The JCS definition for a crisis is,

An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.[25]

The common characteristics of a crisis also serve to reinforce the requirement for an existing JTF Headquarters:

- > The situation requires a time sensitive reaction.
- > The crisis arises with little or no warning from an unusual sequence of events.
- > The norm is that the crisis occurs outside our normal operating area, usually where we have only general contingency plans.[26]

In responding to a crisis the commander's problems routinely include:

- > Sketchy information with little time to collect additional information.
- > Visibility of events which creates an added emphasis on operational security (OPSEC) during planning.
- > Visibility during execution which places extreme pressure on the commander.
- > Time constraints that limit the opportunity to form, contemplate and massage courses of action.
- > Circumstances which require a tailored force.
- > MultiService task organizations that require definition of command relationships, operating procedures, logistics support, etc..[27]

If a joint warfighting headquarters existed then this would eliminate the first step, creating the team to plan the U.S. response.

This would also lessen the OPSEC problem. Their training could include drills which sequestered the Headquarters, thus eliminating the signal of exceptional activity whenever we plan a crisis response. Also, you would not have to either rally the component's planners at the CINC's headquarters, a signal of our intended course of action, or, worse yet, plan an operation without the tactical or operational expertise just because of OPSEC .

Additionally, a standing headquarters would have better quality control over personnel. Rather than accept temporary duty personnel because of the pressures of time, a standing JTF could screen the records of the personnel nominated for assignment, thus ensuring the proper mix of skill and experience. This avoids a major pitfall, the temporary duty assignment of individuals who are considered expendable from their parent units during combat. In some cases we go to war with plans drafted by those who are neither needed nor wanted by their command during combat.

Since the headquarters has a crisis orientation it should be ahead of the strategic decision cycle, both in recognizing a crisis and wargaming the response. If the team is in place and trained, then their wargaming of potential crises, their knowledge of the components and relationship with subordinates should mean that they will fine tune a previously developed concept of operations not create one.

The most significant benefit would be the existence of a "known soldier," more importantly, a cohesive team of "known soldiers." It will be worth the cost because of the positive impact on COMJTF's ability to pass on his intent, have the "fingerspitzengefühl" of his force and fight his force.

Plan, Deploy and Fight

The essence of conceptual "fit." Review the Grenada planning cycle -- CINCLANT Staff, joint planning conference and finally, JTF 120 -- and think of the potential for misunderstanding, confusion and missing details, especially at the joint-operational level. A level where you plan based on the commander's instinct and intuition.

- > What maneuver might work and what won't?
- > What's important and what's not?
- > When to strike and when not to?
- > What's too much and what's not enough?[28]

These are questions which COMJTF and his staff must answer to develop an operation or campaign plan.

The concept of a standing JTF has been previously employed to resolve difficult operational situations. In the early 1980's the Southwest Asia scenarios presented difficult deployment and employment problems. To resolve them a standing JTF was formed, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. It brought and kept together the experts to tackle the problems of deploying and fighting. In Just Cause we saw in JTF South (XVIII Airborne Corps) an excellent example of the commander and staff being in the operation -- the planning, the deployment and the combat.

Joint

To avoid "discernible conventions and patterns," a crisis action headquarters must be a joint headquarters.[29] This is the best way to rally the operational expertise required to explore all the options for forced entry. The staff's expertise must be founded in current, successful operational experience. It must be composed of pilots who are current on night vision goggles and ground officers with Training Center or Combined Arms Exercise experience.

A second imperative is that the staff have a cohesive "joint think" about operations. Each member must be able to champion the warfighting and organizational philosophy of his Service and to acknowledge its capabilities and limitations, while being able to divorce himself from the parochialisms of his Service. He must be able to view the other Services in similar light. They must trust one another to must pursue the best operational decision not the best Service solution or compromise of Service positions.

This is more difficult than legislating common sense. We come to the joint arena with Service unique doctrines, attitudes, opinions and experiences. Ideas based on concepts and warfighting doctrine founded in our Service's cauldron of battle, all dearly held by each of us. Two U.S. Army War College studies, Service Uniqueness - Stumbling Blocks to Jointness, [30] and The Navy In The Joint Arena: Antagonist or Team Player?, [31] provide excellent insight into the origins and depths of these feelings. We are dealing with strongly felt ideas and perceptions about warfighting, command, leadership, etc. . Ideas whose roots were set in basic officer training courses. These are the attitudes, ideas, and concepts that made each of us successful. The challenge for the joint staff officer is to use his intellect for positive not parochial purposes. Yet, we require COMJTF and his staff to make this step on the fly when we form the headquarters during crisis action. We are asking them to overcome the human tendency to stick with what they are familiar and has brought them success.

Joint-Operational Art

Recently much has been written about the operational art and what it contributes to warfare. The operational art:

- > Gives substance to strategy.
- > Gives meaning to the cost of battle.
- > Is the highest purely military activity of the three levels of war.
- > Is what wins wars.
- > "It is the art the citizens of our country pay us, in the interests of national security, to apply with skill in wartime." [32]

In his five challenges to the new generation of joint specialty officers, General Depuy offered three which fall directly into the arena of COMJTF and his staff:

- > Improving the track record in the operational art.
- > Providing joint command and control over joint collateral support operations.
- > Creating the conditions required for the synchronization of cross-service support at the tactical level.[33]

As the joint-operational commander, COMJTF is the key stanchion in the bridge between strategy and tactics. His tools are the art and science of warfare. Defining art as the creativity of doing and science as knowing, then COMJTF's challenge is knowing the capabilities, doctrines and tactics of the force and creating positional advantage through planning, deployment and employment. His concept must create a situation where tactical actions at separate locations take on operational and strategic meaning.[34]

The characteristics of his plan are more esoteric than concrete.

It should exhibit creativity and novelty; avoid discernible conventions and patterns; make use of the artifice, ambiguity and deception; and demonstrate, as Churchill wrote, "an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten." [12] It should present multiple options, so that we can adjust to changing events and so that the enemy cannot discern our true intent. And it should provide for speed in execution which is a weapon in itself.[35]

Yet there are critical differences in a crisis action operation or campaign.

A classic operational concept requires the commander to meld the following over time and space:

- > Synchronizing tactical action for operational meaning.
- > Visualizing alternatives and sequels after the initial battle.
- > Conducting long-term, extended range intelligence operations.
- > Defeating the enemy's operational art.
- > Maneuvering forces at the operational level.
- > Employing operational fires.
- > Maintaining the operational tempo by an energetic decision cycle.
- > Anticipating the culminating point of victory.[36]

A crisis action COMJTF considers these but he must do so in one compressed decision cycle. This makes crisis action, joint-operational planning more difficult, especially when the CINC forms a JTF Headquarters under the pressures of imminent combat.

The joint-operational art translates words into joint, combined arms action. A creative process that requires knowledge of American military doctrine and capabilities but whose product arises from a vision of the battlefield in time and space. A process that requires a joint, combined arms vision, one which our background and experience give us little preparation, A process which is further complicated by the compressed planning cycle of crisis action.

Trained

This leads to the crux of the problem, the requirement for a trained, cohesive JTF command element. Crisis military responses will become a tougher task if we must fight our way onto the

battlefield and then fight ground forces with modern, heavy weapons as we build our ground combat power on the battlefield. First battle experience shows that fighting men won't fail their commander but that their commander may fail them.

"Virtually every case studied emphasized the lack of realistic large-scale operational exercises before the first battle, exercises that might have taught commanders and their staffs the hard, practical side of their wartime business as even the most basic training introduces it to the soldier at the small unit level. Virtually every case study indicates that the results of confusion, demoralization and exhaustion at the command-and-staff level are at best bloody, at worst irremediable -- a more crippling defect even than combat units falling apart, because units can often be relieved or replaced in time, headquarters almost never."[37]

Our preparation must emphasize training and education on two axes. The collective training of the staff and commander, and the individual professional development of the officers who serve on these JTF staffs.

Each of us could spend a career studying our individual warfare skill, our Service's warfighting doctrine and warfare in the predominant medium of our warfare skill. As joint warfighters we must add an understanding for many warfare skills and then make command decisions involving national interests and the lives of our warriors as they fight on land and sea, and in the air.

Ask yourself if your professional schooling and reading have developed in you the joint operational skill and confidence to be the commander or joint staff officer who drafts the detailed plan or selects a course of action for a joint forced entry operation involving a counterair battle and war-at-sea? This is a question

of special trust and confidence, a standard to which each of us must hold ourselves.

Unfortunately the day-to-day crush of business and the volume of information on warfighting prevent most of us from attaining this professional pinnacle. However, when assigned to a dedicated crisis-action, joint-operational staff these subjects would be our day-to-day focus and the collection of talent would be greater than the sum of the parts.

When do we collectively train the JTF staff? Team Spirit, Ocean Venture, Solid Shield and similar exercises are the training vehicles. These are expensive training aids, even on a biyearly basis, especially when you factor in the personnel turbulence. Within the Services there are excellent simulations and exercises that could replicate the fog and friction of joint planning and combat. These simulations provide not only computer feedback but other feed back such as videotapes of staff interaction and critiques by retired officers who have commanded in combat. The Army's Battle Command Training Program or the Marine Corps' Marine Air Ground Task Force Battle Staff Training programs are excellent examples of the training required by the JTF commander and staff.[38] Known for their wargaming abilities, I'm sure both the Air and Naval War Colleges either have or could tailor a wargame that would break a sweat on any COMJTF's brow. However, to take advantage of these opportunities a staff must exist.

Another low cost training opportunity is to observe major training exercises and deployments. Possibilities are the Army's Training Center exercises, the Special Operations Capability evaluations of the Fleet's amphibious forces, the Air Force's "Flag" exercises and Navy Fleet Exercises.

Through creative exercise design, a standing JTF staff could satellite on the training exercises of their likely components. This would not only improve training; it would establish working relationships below the flag officer level; and it would allow for the development and refinement of standing operating procedures, command and control requirements, communications plans and interoperability issues.

Command Structure

In the days of shrinking budgets and end-strength, a proposal for another headquarters isn't very practical. The existing JTF Headquarters alternative is a best case solution to showcase the opportunity to improve our performance and reduce the cost of first battles. Each Unified CINC needs to employ a "directed telescope" to review the unique aspects of his theater and force structure to determine how he can have a "ready" COMJTF and joint headquarters for forced entry operations.[39]

Obviously, the best solution is a headquarters targeted at the mission. The key is focus, what is important in the day-to-day business of the command -- peacetime requirements or joint

warfighting. Ask yourself if John Shy's analysis applies to your experience?

"Headquarters ... habitually expend their time and energies on routine administration, seldom pushing, training and testing themselves as they push, train and test their troops. ... The implied lesson is that senior commanders and their staffs might do well to free themselves from the routine busywork ... and to plan and carry out frequent, more realistic training exercises for themselves involving several command levels and arms, that hone skills that otherwise must be bought with blood and, possibly, defeat." [40]

Think back to the contentious issues of the Grenada operation. How many would not have come to the forefront if JTF 120 had been a cohesive staff, trained in the joint-operational art. Would their training have filled the gaps about how their subordinates deployed and fought? Would their team work, cohesion and intellectual honesty have allowed them to ask the difficult questions, to challenge assumptions without fear of embarrassing their Service or themselves? Would their SOP's, communications plans, etc. have anticipated many of the details perhaps overlooked in the short planning cycle?

There are other benefits in this solution. It would create billets for experienced operators in the joint specialty officer world. This is a partial answer to General Depuy's challenges. These billets could be an incentive to draw successful commanders and operators into the joint arena. Billets for technical, low density specialist now predominate the Joint Duty Assignment List. [41] The operational-level joint specialist would provide

current tactical and operational warfighting expertise. He would be the bridge between the strategist and the warfighters, and provide operational insight and direction to the specialists.

The Alternatives

No matter how many good points the dedicated headquarters solution may have, the current fiscal environment demands alternative courses of action. In evaluating their merit the following issues are key.

> Can the CINC relieve his JTF Headquarters from the requirements of day-to-day business and focus it on joint-operational warfighting and training?

> Can this headquarters conduct a vigorous joint training program of exercises, wargames and observation trips?

The following are three possible alternatives:

CINC's Nucleus Staff. One alternative is for the CINC to create an in-house JTF nucleus. The major problem is to identify a flag officer and 25 field grade officers with recent operational experience that have the time to focus on joint-operational warfare. Officers who can be absent from the headquarters for perhaps 25% of the year to execute the training program.

A Component Headquarters with Augmentation. This alternative designates a component headquarters as the contingency JTF headquarters. This alternative benefits from having a headquarters with an operational-level, warfighting focus and up-to-date experience in at least one warfare environment. It also would have the "fingerspitzengefühl" for its subordinates. The obvious

shortfalls are the lack of operational experience with the other components and environments, and staffing to represent the other Services. Training can address the first deficiency and two alternatives exist for filling the personnel gap. One is permanently staffing the selected headquarters as a joint headquarters. The other is using designees from the other components or the CINC's headquarters.

Keys to success are the designated headquarters retaining a JTF perspective from day-to-day and the long term assignment (18 - 24 months) of quality designees. The CINC has to demand continuous training and quality designees, and be the final arbiter of quality issues.

A JTF Headquarters Below the Component Level. The alternative I favor is selection of a headquarters below the component level and to upgrade its capabilities to enable it to act as a JTF Headquarters. Specifically, I would upgrade the Fleet's Amphibious Group (PHIBGRU) Headquarters to a contingency JTF Headquarters.

This headquarters is a combined arms headquarters. Its day-to-day business -- amphibious warfare -- involves war-at-sea, land and air warfare. Therefore with minimal additional Army and Air Force staffing, this headquarters could add the dimensions of airborne, air-landed, airmobile and light forces warfare and be a truly combined arms, joint operational headquarters. Additionally, its combined experience in land, sea and air warfare would add greater flexibility if the crisis required a multinational response.

The CINC could select a numbered fleet headquarters, as he did with JTF 120, however, as we saw with JTF 120, it has much less diversified warfighting experience.

As with any of the alternatives, this course requires a lessening of the day-to-day responsibilities. In the case of the Amphibious Groups this might entail splitting the responsibilities for operations from type commander duties as the Marine Corps has done with its Fleet Marine Force Headquarters and its Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters.[42] A final change would be the addition of an Army general officer to this staff as a deputy commander.

An interesting problem that exists with the first and third alternatives is the rank of the JTF commander. The Navy and Army components usually have a three-star flag officer on the battlefield. The Army because of the Corps support requirements and the Navy because of their traditional mission of being "in support" with a numbered fleet. In the first alternative this requires the CINC to find a three-star flag officer to command the nucleus. Selection of the Amphibious Group means the PHIBGRU Commander needs to be a vice admiral. His deputy would be an Army major general. The rank of COMJTF is important. In crisis action he needs to have the horsepower to make his decisions stick.

Conclusion

No matter the choice, the Secretary of Defense's guidance requires the CINC to be able to field a joint, joint-operational level, trained, command structure to plan, deploy and fight in

crisis action. A commander and his staff able to fight effectively on an increasingly sophisticated battlefield. A battlefield which challenges our forced entry capability.

If COMJTF is to succeed, both militarily and politically, his fight must embody the tenets of the operational art. His concept must create a "fit" that rapidly overwhelms the enemy at a bearable cost in the first battle.[43] Anything less may result in loss of public support, and, of much greater significance, a higher price paid by courageous, hard-fighting young men and women.

The JTF Headquarter's mission is preparedness:

- > To be knowledgeable about how to best fight the many and varied capabilities of America's Armed Forces.

- > To get the best return on our investment in high technology.

- > To be a cohesive team of professionals who base their decisions on knowledge and an unbiased view of capabilities, strengths and weaknesses.

Although I favor the PHIBGRU solution, the proverbial bottom line is that the CINC needs to select a command to focus on contingency operations. A command designated before the fact, one given the opportunity to train.

Our Unified Commanders in Chief need to review the bidding in their combatant commands and be sure that a trained, quick response capability exists today for tomorrow's crisis intervention.

Endnotes

[1] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Test Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations. Washington, January 1990, p. x. (hereafter referred to as JCS Pub 3-0 (Test Edition)). Forced entry operations are defined as, "The introduction of an aggregation of military personnel, weapons systems, vehicles, and necessary support, or combination thereof, embarked for the purpose of gaining access through land, air, or amphibious operations into an objective area." It is forcible entry if opposed and administrative deployment if unopposed.

[2] JCS Pub 3-0 (Test Edition), p. x. The terms crisis and conflict are newly defined in this publication. A synthesis of these definitions being, a rapidly developing incident or situation which threatens U.S. interest or creates conditions of such significance that warrant contemplation of the commitment of U.S. military forces, a crisis. A commitment with limited objectives "achieved by short, focused and direct application of force, a conflict.

[3] Richard Cheney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, Washington, U.S. Department of Defense, January 1990, introduction.

Cover title: Annual Report to the President and the Congress.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 2.

[6] Caleb Baker and Neil Munro, "U.S. To Face High-Tech Threat in Low-Intensity Wars," Defense News, 5 February 1990, p. 13.

[7] Cheney, p. 3.

[8] JCS Pub 3-0 (Test Edition), p. xii. Operational art being, "The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations." (Underlined segments added to emphasize the large-scale connotation of the definition.)

[9] JCS Pub 3-0 (Final Draft), p. xiv. The operational level of war being the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives. A level that links tactics to strategy by establishing operational objectives, sequencing events, initiating actions and applying resources in a broader dimension of time and space to ensure support of the tactical force and the means to exploit tactical action.

[10] JCS Pub 3-0 (Final Draft), p. xvii. "War -- Sustained armed conflict between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. War may be limited, with some self-imposed restraints or objectives. Or, it may be general with the total resources of a nation or nations employed and the national survival of a belligerent at stake.

[11] William E. DePuy, "For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb," Parameters, Vol. 29, September 1989, p. 6.

[12] S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The problem of Battle Command in Future War, Glouster, Peter Smith, 1979, p. 153.

[13] "Guidebook for the Exercise of Authority," in Lesson Plan, Campaign Planning Required Readings, Quantico, Marine Air Ground Training and Education Center. n.d., p. 10.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] John Shy, "First Battles in Retrospect," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America's First Battles, 1776 - 1965, Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986, p. 329.

[17] John E. Turlington, LTC, Learning the Operational Art, Student Essay, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, April 1986, p. 19.

[18] Mark Adkins, Urgent Fury: The battle for Grenada, Lexington, Lexington Books. 1989, pp. 125-127, 133 and 135.

[19] Ibid. p. 128.

[20] Marshall, p. 153.

[21] Turlington, p. 18.

[22] Interview with Joseph E Trez, LTC, former commander of 2D Bn, 27th INF, 7th INF during Operation Golden Pheasant, Carlisle Barracks, 10 January 1990.

[23] Marshall, p. 153.

[24] By a Service team I mean the Airborne and MAC in airborne operations or the Navy-Marine Corps team in amphibious or maritime preposition operations. By a predominant Service I am referring to a situation similar to the Navy in the Persian Gulf or the Army in Panama.

[25] JCS Pub 3-0, (Test Edition), p. x.

[26] James H. Dixon and Assoc., Military Planning and Operations: The Joint Perspective, Washington, National Defense University, 1985, p. 107.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Turlington, p.20.

[29] Marine Corps Education and Development Command, Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-2 (Draft), Campaigning, Quantico, n.d., p. 2-8 (hereafter referred to as FMFM 7-2 (Draft)).

[30] Robert R. Buckley, LTC, Service Uniqueness - Stumbling Block To Jointness, Military Studies Project, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 31 March 1989.

[31] William R. Blackburn, CDR. The Navy In The Joint Arena: Antagonist of Team Player? Military Studies Project, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 31 March 1989.

[32] Turlington, p. 3.

[33] Depuy, p. 4.

[34] Stephen E. Runals, "A Different Approach," Military Review, Vol. 67, October 1987, p. 45.

[35] FMFM 7-2 (Draft), p. 2-8.

[36] Gordon R. Sullivan, "Learning to Decide at the Operational Level of War," Military Review. Vol 67. October 1987, p. 17.

[37] Shy, p. 329.

[38] The Army BCTP is an exportable instructional program and computer simulation that replicates an NTC-like training experience for the division and corps headquarters. The Marine Corps' BCT is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade training program designed to teach the MEB's components the tenets of maneuver warfare and to provide experience in there application through training periods at the Marine Aviation and Weapons Training Squadron and Combined Arms Training Center.

[39] Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 75. Van Creveld uses this metaphor to discuss the commanders ability to look into his command to get information on matters which are less structured and not provided by the required reports.

[40] Shy, p.331.

[41] Edward Soriano, LTC, Title IV -- Joint Officer Personnel Policy, Quality versus Quantity, Military Studies Project, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1989, p. 18.

[42] As defined in JCS Pub 1-02, a type command is a naval administrative subdivision of a fleet or force into ships or units of the same type. In the case of COMPHIBGRU he is the type commander for all the amphibious shipping in his respective fleet and, as such, trains, inspects, schedules, rates, etc. all these ships and then assigns them to operational task organizations for deployment. Similar Army positions would include the Head of Army Aviation or the role played by Branch schools in formulating doctrine and policy for the branch.

[43] Depuy, p.6.